
On the side (how many sides can one have?), I've been reading/collecting research on a very interesting pair of figures, whom I am beginning to think are more closely related than we have heretofore thought:
Sir Robert Filmer, the seventeenth-century traditionalist political philosopher, and T.S. Eliot, the twentieth-century poet and conservative social thinker.
The interesting thing about Filmer is not (at least at first blush) his direct influence, which has been negligible, but the extent to which he has been misunderstood by the Lockeans, whose contractarian liberalism certainly carried the day against Filmer's patriarchalism. Famously, Locke responded to the argument of Filmer's
Patriarcha in the first of his
Two Treatises of Government, and Lockean contractarians have frequently defined themselves against a kind of Filmerian patriarchalism up to the present day: indeed, I heard exactly this opposition declared at a seminar panel earlier this year. Filmer represents for present-day Lockeans a kind of proto-paleo-con, and this is not an unreasonable construction, as a few influential paleo-cons have claimed Filmer as an important influence. I think, for instance, of M.E. Bradford, who took the side of Filmer, over against his erstwhile nemesis, Harry Jaffa, who took the side of Locke (see Bradford's "A neglected classic : Filmer's
Patriarcha," in
Saints, Sovereigns, and Scholars [1993]).

Interestingly, it now seems that the influence of Sir Robert on the paleo-conservative tradition has been mediated through T.S. Eliot, who appears to have written a couple of unsigned reviews of Filmer in 1828, a fact unearthed a few years back by David Bradshaw, a British scholar of modernism (see
"Lonely Royalists: T.S. Eliot and Sir Robert Filmer," Review of English Studies 46.183 [1995]). As Bradshaw's argument suggests, Eliot's political thinking seems to have been influenced by Filmer's thought at a critical junction in his career, and in ways we haven't adequately realized yet. This could be an interesting trail to follow, because T.S. Eliot exerted a great influence on the American conservative Russell Kirk, and thus on what became the paleo-conservative movement as a whole (esp. important here are his
Idea of a Christian Society [1939] and Notes Toward the Definition of Culture [1948]). So the historical tension between (Lockean) neo-conservatism and (Filmerian) paleo-conservatism does seem to go back at lest to the earlier Twentieth Century, even if we can't see much of it in the Nineteenth.

I said originally, though, that the Lockeans misunderstood Filmer, and here is what I meant: as a number of scholars have shown over the past few decades, Filmer was responding in the
Patriarcha, not to Hobbes or some other proto-Lockean political thinker (though he did write against Hobbes, Milton, and others elsewhere), but to the late-scholastic political philosophy of
Robert Bellarmine and
Francisco Suarez, who had been developing Thomistic theories of natural rights, regicide, etc., over the half-century prior to Filmer's work. So while Locke's followers (and perhaps Locke himself) have tended to see the political-theoretical choice as between Filmerian patriarchalism and their own brand of secularized contract theory, that binary now seems too simple. Certainly, it was not so simple at the time Filmer and Locke were writing. So now, since we could very much use a fresh (yet theoretically dense and historically grounded) view of human nature and how to think about it in the modern world, it seems we might do well to look at Suarez and Bellarmine, and consider the extent to which they provide a
tertium quid, a third way for those of us not entirely satisfied with either paleo- and neo-conservatism.
Interesting post. I'm struggling with these same issues right now. I've just read John Neville Figgis' classic work on Divine Right of Kings, a book well worth reading for anyone interested in the topic. Figgis claims that Filmer was the first one to base his argument for the divine right of kings on an appeal to nature thereby in fact laying the foundation for Locke's upheaval of divine right of kings. In effect Filmer was conceding the weakness of the arguments from Scripture or law for divine right of kings. By turning to nature he undermined his own case. Figgis argues persuasively that appeals to Scripture, nature, king, pope or the people were always conditioned by their historical usefulness to Catholic, King or Presbyterian. In an Appendix he later added to his book John Neville Figgis finds his own third way lying nascent in Presbyterianism which borrowed from Bellarmine and Suarez to frame the basis of its own political theory. Figgis claims that Locke's appeal to divine right of nature collapses with his appeal to a fictional state of nature. According to Figgis, as I understand him, the pursuit of divine right as a foundation for political society is replaced by an appeal to utilitarianism in the modern day. As I read Figgis, this seems to be the sort of conservatism he adheres to-one where utility and experience form the foundation. He worked closely with Lord Acton by the way.
ReplyDeleteI've also just started reading Stefania Tutino's book Empire of Souls, which describes Bellarmine's political theory, particularly as it played out in the Oath of Allegiance controversy. Figgis, as I recall, describes Bellarmine as appealing to natural law and the people only intermediately with the aim of asserting papal power. Thus there is no divine right of nature or divine right of the people to determine the government. Rather the divine right of the pope is established, indirectas potestas. Defending papal supremacy against the claims of King James is his whole concern, not the establishment of a new foundation for civil society founded in nature or natural law. As Figgis points out Bellarmine and Suarez were later adopted gleefully by Protestants once divine right of kings no longer served as a means of opposing the pope and became instead a means of imposing High Church Anglicanism on the Presbyterians. The liberal use of Suarez and others by the Scottish Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford in his treatise Lex Rex was something that had surprised me when I first read that classic work of Presbyterian scholastic thought. Catholics in turn rejected Bellarmine and Suarez once the English King was a Catholic, and the Pope had come to see how Bellarmine's principles served to undermine the argument for the divine right of the pope, just as Filmer's appeal to nature had actually opened the door to the collapse of the case for divine right of kings.
I don't know how well I'm stating Figgis' points, and I apologize for the stream of consciousness manner in which I have responded. I do recommend both Figgis and Tutino though if you haven't seen them already.
Donald,
ReplyDeleteFascinating thoughts. I haven't seen the Figgis book, but I'm excited to read it, now that I hear your account--it actually sounds very much in my area of interest, but b/c he was a Victorian, and because of his theoretical aims. I have seen the Tutino book, and would note that she is the translator of the volume of Bellarmine's political thought from Liberty Fund. A good friend of mine here is teaching classes Bellarmine and Suarez' political thought this Fall, so if you have any further questions, I could put you in touch with him--he's also interested in Reformed scholasticism...
I'm still on the early side of learning about these things, but I'll be in touch as I read more.
always good to hear from you,
--D
I hadn't seen this post--sorry for the somewhat random late response here.
ReplyDeleteFiggis' book is available on Google in full: http://books.google.com/books?id=HPw8AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
The distinction between the the society of the family and the society of the city, which is obviously quite clear in Aristotle, is what Filmer and, it seems, Bodin and others were destroying in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That is a big deal. That distinction also seems to be undermined in later so-called conservatives like Calhoun, etc. Why Locke had to make the moves he did (state of nature, natural right to punish evildoers, etc.) in order to defend the classic distinction is what remains somewhat unclear to me. I am starting to think that it might have something to do with the rejection of final causes and a new conception of natural law, but I just don't know yet.
Apparently, James Tyrrell gives a very robust response to Filmer. He was friends with Locke, but I'd like to know more. Julia Rudolph has a book on him and the importance of an old-school Whig political philosophy... Or something along those lines.
The rejection of final causes led Locke to make the moves he did...Filmer's rejection? His own rejection? Everyone's rejection. I don't quite follow...
ReplyDelete